Gregory J. Hayes
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer at RTX
Yeah. Ron, we should differentiate between the durability issues that Shane talked about, and I call this the manufacturing quality issue. Let's just take a step back, right? This is an issue that we first uncovered back in 2020 when we had an incident with the V2500 turbine disc. As a result of that investigation, we determined at that point that we had some contamination in this powdered metal that we make. It occurred very, very rarely, but it did happen, and it actually resulted in the turbine disc failure on an airline. As a result of that, we went through and did two things. First of all, we went out and inspected the V2500 fleet, but we also went back and we took a look at the powdered metal process to determine how this contamination happened. Through a lot of work, through a lot of discovery, we figured out what the contaminants were. And by the end of 2021, about a year after that, we were able to manufacture a powder that was, I would say, contaminant-free to the best of our ability. At the same time, we knew that this contamination had occurred between 20 -- late 2015 and late 2020, early 2021. So, we knew we had a suspect population in the fleet. And we went out and like -- and so we started inspecting. We inspected the turbine discs as they were manufactured. We inspected turbine discs as they came back in, not just for the V, but for the whole GTF fleet; in fact, the entire fleet of Pratt products that were manufactured during this time frame. That -- those inspections, and there were over 3,000 of those inspections, yielded a very, very small fallout rate, less than 1%.
So, as Chris said, all of this data goes into our lifing model for the turbine disc. And based upon everything that we knew until very recently, we believe that the life of the turbine disc was such that we would see these discs in the shop and be able to inspect them before we ever had an issue. Now, as we again, looked at the data again over the last couple of months, our safety risk assessment, our safety board, went through their process of updating the data based on all the recent findings, and they said, you know what, we're not absolutely positive that the lifing model is accurate. And so, we're going to take it -- we want to take a look at these discs at a much accelerated basis. I would tell you that is exactly the way the process is supposed to work. And so, we're going to pull back 200 discs, or 200 engines and look at the discs here in the next 90 days or so. In the next year based upon those findings from the first 200, we think there's probably another 1,000 out there. So, 1,200 out of a little over 3,000 engines out there have to be inspected. But this is not a manufacturer -- I'm sorry, it's not a design issue. In fact, the engineers have been working on this issue hand-in-glove with the safety board and everybody else in manufacturing for the last three years. So, I don't believe that we have an engineering issue. Obviously, this was a quality escape back from 20 -- sometime between 2015 and 2020. And we are doing, I think, exactly the right thing, which is to bring these engines back, inspect them, and ensure the safety of the fleet going forward. And I think, again, it's -- obviously, look, this engine has -- Ron, as you know, has been a challenge since we launched it back in 2015. And you guys can remember talking about boat rotors [Phonetic] and all the other issues that we had. But if you think about this engine operating at the temperatures that we do, it has been a continuous discovery. This is not one of them. This is simply a quality issue from a manufacturing problem.
So, I would say, look, we're on top of it, we've got this, it's going to be expensive. We're going to make the airlines hold as a result of the disruption we're going to cause them. And I think we're going to work ourselves through it. It's not an existential threat to RTX, it's not an existential threat to Pratt. It is a problem and we have them every day and we'll solve it.